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Abstract In light of the persistence of discourses of atrocity in the post-Holocaust era, 
and with the resurgence of talk of evil that followed 11 September 2001, it is clear that the 
idea of evil still possesses a powerful hold upon the modern imagination. Yet the interplay of 
evil and the political imagination – in particular, how different images of evil have shaped the 
discourses and practices of international politics – remains neglected. This article suggests 
that evil is depicted through three contending images within international politics – evil as 
individualistic, as statist and as systemic – and their corresponding forms of collective 
imagination – the juridical, the humanitarian and the political. It argues further that the 
dominance of the juridical and, to a lesser extent, the humanitarian imagination obscures our 
ability to imagine and respond to political evils of structural or systemic violence. Drawing 
on the example of global poverty, this article contends that the ability to portray and critically 
judge systemic evils in international politics today depends upon enriching our narratives 
about indefensible atrocities and reimagining our shared political responsibilities for them. 
 














If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, 




When Hannah Arendt wrote, in 1945, that ‘the problem of evil will be the fundamental 
question of postwar intellectual life in Europe’ (1994, p. 134, emphasis added), she was one 
of the few intellectuals to take this claim seriously. As Tony Judt (2008) recounts, ‘Far from 
reflecting upon the problem of evil in the years that followed the end of World War II, most 
Europeans turned their heads resolutely away from it. . . . Indeed, most people – intellectuals 
and others – ignored it as much as they could’. The challenge to modern intellectual life of 
imagining the ‘unimaginable’ is one of the enduring effects of the Nazi conquest of Europe. 
As historian and Holocaust scholar Saul Friedländer remarks, the Nazi extermination camps 
serve as ‘the indelible reference point of the Western imagination’ (1993, p. 62). For the past 
sixty years philosophers, historians, jurists and international theorists have sought to make 
evil imaginable in the post-Second World War international order. Yet the problem of what 
we do and do not discursively frame as evil and why – and whether our modes of imagining 
and understanding evil can adequately address atrocities beyond the reference point of the 
Shoah – remains as troubling today as it was for Arendt in 1945. 
 In light of the resurgence of talk of evil in the wake of 9/11, it is clear that the idea of 
evil still possesses a powerful hold upon the modern imagination. This paper takes up 
Arendt’s characterization of the challenge posed by the problem of evil as a point of entry for 
thinking about how narratives and images are employed to convey, reflect upon and interpret 
the sources, processes and consequences of evil within contemporary international political 
discourse. Of particular interest are three contending images of evil within international 
political discourse – evil as individualistic, as statist, and as systemic – and how these images 
correspond to forms of collective imagination that embody different models to identify, judge 
and confront the spectre of evil. Do the images of evil invoked discursively and materially in 
international politics adequately address the modalities of evil that appear on today’s political 
landscape? Can the paradigmatic individualistic and statist images of evil provide the 
resources to rescue the image of systemic evil from political oblivion? I argue that the notion 
of systemic evil, when placed within the conceptual frame of structural violence, is an 
important corrective to the unnecessarily atrophied sense of inexcusable suffering that 
characterizes contemporary international political discourse. In appreciating that systemic 
evils – in particular the existential evil of global poverty – should be understood as one of the 
central problems of humanly-induced evil, it is possible to enrich our narratives about 
indefensible atrocities and to reimagine our shared political responsibilities for them. 
 
Three Images of Evil in International Political Discourse 
Following the 11 September 2001 assault on the World Trade Center, the language of evil has 
(re)captured our imagination. But despite its recent prominence, the presuppositions and 
limits of the political imagination of evil and its relationship to other idioms of gross 
atrocities have been subject to little scrutiny. In such a global political climate as ours, 
however, where talk of evil frequently has been condensed to the ‘metaphysical essence’ of 
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terrorism, it is necessary both to question this specific condensation and to explore how the 
language of evil has the capacity to speak to other pathologies of the modern human 
condition. 
Before beginning, brief clarification of what I mean by the phrase ‘political 
imagination’ is in order. The political imagination refers to the ways that various agents 
envision and give sense to their political existence, including the means and ends of the 
political communities they inhabit, the relations they have to each other and to power, and the 
expectations they have of one another and for what they can accomplish in the world. The 
political imagination is both broader and deeper than formal theories or doctrines of political 
reality, as it is often conveyed in images, metaphors and narratives which are shared by many 
people. The political imagination therefore can be seen as an intersubjective ‘background’ 
understanding that makes possible collective political practices and a widely shared sense of 
a common world as a basis for taking our moral and political bearings.
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Ultimately, the political imagination has both active and contemplative dimensions 
that reflect our efforts to intervene in, make sense of, and respond to events affecting our 
sense of political reality (Taylor, 2004). Such interventions illustrate the possibility of 
moving from one political imagination to another, where the established contents of these 
imaginations can be questioned and redefined in light of predicaments that affect our 
collective moral and political existence. Because when we confront evil the first thing we 
encounter in most cases is a narrative about what happened and what it meant, the reflective 
capacity of the imagination is particularly well-suited to translating the idea of evil into 
collectively shared ‘stories in the public sphere’. The narrative reconstruction of human 
cruelty and wrongdoing can, in Maria Pia Lara’s view, ‘recover the ineffable into a moral 
understanding of what has happened’, how it affects us and how it may be prevented in future 
(2007, p. 59). In this sense, the political imagination is a practice we employ to represent who 
we were, who we have become, and who we will be with regard to collectively suffered 
atrocities. The imagination therefore is a crucial force not only for understanding evil and for 
reflective self-definition in light of that understanding, but consequently for shaping whatever 
sense of responsibility we may have towards our world in which evil appears.  
How then do we imagine the unimaginable in the realm of international politics? I 
suggest that we can formulate a rough yet useful answer to this question by drawing on the 
three-levels-of-analysis approach, and its reference to three different ‘images’ of international 
relations theories, proffered by Kenneth Waltz (1959). Waltz’s influential images of ‘man, 
the state, and war’ offer an ‘all-pervasive’ model of explaining phenomena of international 
politics in terms of ‘levels of analysis’ (Walker, 1993, p. 131). Yet the purpose in using 
Waltz’s theory here is quite limited and is also considerably different from the 
methodological debates surrounding his work within International Relations scholarship. 
Setting aside the neorealist and positivistic commitments of Waltz’s theory, the interpretive 
concern rather is with how the schematic concept of discursive ‘images’ can reveal how evil 
typically is depicted or made visible within international affairs and, conversely, how other 
forms of evil then may not appear as such. In other words, the main point for consideration is 
ontological and hermeneutical, that is, it is interested with what we see as well as how we see 
in terms of our intersubjective background understandings. Facing the problem of evil in 
terms of what and how we see is useful because, according to Arendt, the ‘sense’ that 
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corresponds with thinking is that of ‘sight’ (2003b, p. 793); it is on the back of ‘sight’, 
‘representation’, ‘appearance’ – in short, of the ‘disclosing’ vision of imagination – that the 
activities of thinking, understanding and judging rest, inasmuch as the imagination creates 
openings in thought for critical reflection and debate about what is and what should not be. 
I suggest that there are three contending narratives within international politics that 
imagine diverse forms of evil circulating at slightly different levels: the first narrative links to 
imagery of individual persons and ‘human nature’ (first image); the second narrative to 
imagery of states and their internal social processes (second image); and the third narrative to 
imagery of the interstate (or, more recently, global) system (third image). Narratives of evil in 
modern international political discourse correspondingly are expressed by the symbolic and 
institutional forms of the malevolent individual, the corrupt regime, and the malfunctioning 
international order. 
The first image calls for a focus on the attributes of individuals. Within this 
individualistic image, evil often is seen as emerging from an intrinsic possibility of human 
nature or behaviour itself. Following in the tradition of Christian theology as well as 
Hobbesian realism, the first image holds that the root of all evil is the corruption inherent in 
the individual – ‘the same fatal weakness in human nature’, as Arendt (2003a, p. 108) 
summarizes this view. Bluntly put, the great social or political evils, refracted through the 
images of such cruelties as torture, massacre and genocide, are reducible to some malevolent 
individuals and their reprehensible inclinations. In Augustinian terms evil is the ‘lack’ of 
being (goodness), while in Kantian terms it is the perverse denial of the moral law through an 
impurity of will (Neiman, 2002). Projected onto the international realm, the first image 
presents a catalogue of paradigmatic ‘diabolical’ individuals, including Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, 
Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. 
The second statist image focuses on the corruption inherent in certain types of 
domestic political orders rather than in individuals per se. Here, evil is mediated 
endogenously by the specific means and ends adopted by a particular regime, with or without 
popular support. At times, a state’s evil acts may be the unintended result of the pursuit of 
‘the good’, as exemplified in the just war principle of double effect (Walzer, 1977, pp. 151–
59). More radically, a state may strive to do evil for evil’s sake, such as abducting, torturing 
and ‘disappearing’ political opponents, gratuitously targeting ‘enemies of the state’, and 
viciously repressing or exterminating innocent segments of the civilian population. 
International (and comparative) politics, following in the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions, 
has seized upon a typology of regimes formulated to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ 
states. Over the past half-century the second image has coalesced around the typological 
dichotomy of democratic and non-democratic regimes (Huntington, 1991), or ‘first-class’ and 
‘second-class’ regimes (Geis, 2013). The former is thought to represent if not goodness itself, 
then at least a more reliable bulwark against political evils, while the latter (whether despotic, 
tyrannical, totalitarian or, in Rawlsian terminology, ‘outlaw’) signifies the wrongdoings that 
contaminate a body politic from within (Rawls, 1999). 
Finally, the third image shifts focus to attributes or conditions that underlie the 
interstate system as a whole. Combining historical experience with diverse insights drawn 
from theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism, this image posits a correspondence 
between evil and various factors such as aggressive desire for power, defection from the rules 
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of international cooperation, and failure to internalize modern international norms given the 
arrangement of the international system. Whether portrayed in terms of the violation of order 
or peace, the third image superimposes evil upon the anarchic character and endemic 
uncertainties and frailties that make transgressions within the international sphere much more 
likely to occur systemically. Perhaps the most consistently great evil projected by the third 
image is the institutionalized condition of war, which perpetually threatens and regularly 
destroys the ‘peace and security’ of all nations. In general terms, the very operation of the 
interstate system is prone to unleashing destructive actions that gravely harm humanity or the 
international community. 
The first two narratives have materialized powerfully in the collective imagination via 
the discursive registers of ‘crimes against humanity’ (first image) and ‘state crimes’ (second 
image). While crimes against humanity denote the types of severe human rights violations 
committed by individual perpetrators, state crimes refer to those committed by ‘self-
contained’ (Rawls, 1971) sovereign polities. In both cases, the concept of ‘crime’ has come to 
resignify the types of morally abhorrent harms that often appear as ‘evil’. The popular post-
Second World War turn towards human rights-based conceptions of evil has both focused 
attention on protecting individuals from governmental abuse, and given evil a ‘regulatory’ 
face by demarcating legal criteria and boundaries for the legitimate powers of states and the 
claims of their citizens.
2
 As Tom Campbell (1999, p. 18) points out, the now-familiar 
juridical paradigm of evil, inclusive of the first and second images, ‘connects human rights 
with a shared perception of totally unacceptable evils which are never justified and 
undermine the claims to political legitimacy of any system of government’.  
 
Structural Violence and Systemic Evil 
Meanwhile, what is foreclosed in the juridical paradigm is a correspondingly powerful 
translation for the third image of evil, that is, there is no similarly thriving narrative of 
systemic evils that effectively result from the arrangements of the international system itself. 
While the first and second images of evil have done much to expand our view of the types of 
unacceptable harms that people suffer, they simultaneously restrict our vision in crucial ways. 
Most importantly, the legal model of human rights violations shared by the first and second 
images has fostered a juridical imagination that overshadows the political imagination. The 
juridical imagination makes sense of inhuman wrongs by portraying these as familiar types of 
discrete harms that result directly from the actions or omissions of specific agents (Vernon, 
2002). These harms are correlated to violations of the standardly recognized (typically civil 
and political) rights of particular victims. Those responsible for such violations, and therefore 
capable of being held legally accountable, are particular agents who can be singled out in a 
clear causal chain of intentional (or reasonably foreseeable) action or omission (Ainley, 
2011). What falls beyond the field of vision of the juridical imagination, however, are the 
more complex causal chains and social relationships constitutive of systemic orders which 
may indirectly inflict intolerably severe harms on a vast number of people. Because the 
juridical paradigm elides such indirect harms, one of the ways that we can contribute to 
challenging its assumptions about the nature of ‘good and evil’ is by broadening our field of 
vision to include the systemic evils of the global institutional order and placing an emphasis 
on the evil of such wrongs at the epicentre of the political imagination. The challenge is to 
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remedy the neglect of systemic wrongs within the international political imagination, without 
adopting such a broad definition of ‘evil’ that it loses all coherence or meaning. This can best 
be achieved by drawing upon the concept of structural violence. 
 Structural violence refers to systemic exploitation, discrimination, marginalization 
and domination that avoidably impairs the capabilities of some to live a properly human life 
on a daily basis (Galtung, 1990). Within the international system examples of structural 
violence include contemporary forms of slavery and human bondage, racist and sexist 
migration and asylum policy, and chronic global poverty. While each of these social forces 
can be brought to bear on the political imagination of evil, the focus here is the harm of 
severe global poverty. Structural violence should be understood in light of the socially 
transmitted beliefs, values, behaviours, and norms that are more or less sedimented in the 
‘basic structure of society’, in something like the broad Rawlsian sense (Rawls, 1971), and 
which manifest in grossly unequal life chances that strike at the capability of some people to 
live a fully human life. I take for granted that this basic structure is composed within as well 
as between plural societies globally. Iris Young maintains that such violence – what she calls 
‘structural injustice’ – is systemic as well in the sense that it lacks a direct and discrete causal 
chain of responsibility; rather it is the result of multiple interrelated structures of belief and 
organization (Young, 2011). Unlike standard human rights violations, which connote discrete 
actions intentionally committed by specific agents against specific victims, structural 
violence arises from the norms and practices embedded in the rules and processes of 
everyday life (both public and private). Thus structural violence is largely indirect, typically 
resulting from socially condoned discourses, patterns of learned behaviour, normalized 
collective actions and widely accepted routines of socially, economically and politically 
organized life. We may also say that rather than being overtly coercive, structural violence is 
a more subtle process which acquires a normalcy that makes it difficult to recognize or detect. 
As part of routine social processes, structural violence inhabits the background conditions of 
our decisions, interactions and projects, underpins our expectations about the world, and 
reinforces how and what we see in certain ways rather than others. 
 Structural violence is relatively imperceptible – at least to those who are less 
susceptible to its effects – compared to the juridically-transparent image of evil as discrete 
harms inflicted by the circumscribed acts of specific agents against specific victims. The 
large-scale and widespread harms of structural violence are not easily traced to a single 
source, and they largely are sustained by the routine assumptions and actions of a vast 
number of people, very few of whom can be described as evil. For this reason structural 
violence escapes the juridical field of vision, inasmuch as its scale and complexity are 
virtually unimaginable from the perspective of the more familiar paradigm of legal 
culpability. Despite the relative opacity of structural violence, it is nevertheless the product of 
human agency: human beings create, perpetuate, occupy and deploy the structures and 
institutions of socio-political life that have a dehumanizing impact. For this reason we need to 
‘stretch’ our imagination in ways which make it possible to see that it has become 
increasingly easy for persons around the world to contribute to grave global harms – even if 
our personal contribution to the overall harm may be unintentional, indirect and marginal (as, 
for example, when considering the impact of our individual actions on the environment in the 
case of climate change). 
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 In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls states that the ‘great evils of human history’ – 
which he takes to include not only unjust war, religious persecution and genocide but also 
‘starvation and poverty’ – follow from the conditions sustained by unjust institutions within 
the social and political structure (1999, pp. 6–7, 9, 109). This perspective challenges us, as 
Rawls states, to perceive how severe global poverty constitutes one form of reasonably 
foreseeable systemic evil to which human agents around the world can effectively contribute. 
The interrelated elements and organizational structures of the political-economic global order 
together give rise to systemic conditions within which intolerably harmful poverty is 
produced and sustained. Consider in this regard that severe poverty causes at least eighteen 
million deaths each year and drastically stunts the lives of millions more (Pogge, 2007, p. 
13). Approximately one-third of all deaths each year are due to poverty-related maternal, 
perinatal and nutritional conditions (malnutrition, unsafe water, poor sanitation and hygiene), 
and preventable and treatable communicable diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis) 
(UNDP, 2005, pp. 21–24). What is more, the ‘excess morbidity’ caused by poverty-related 
conditions is exacerbated by social discrimination and political exclusion on the grounds of 
race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion and language (Farmer, 2010). 
 In The Atrocity Paradigm, Claudia Card suggests that evil can be conceived as 
wrongful ruinous suffering, that is, as egregious suffering that foreseeably and indefensibly 
ruins lives. Conduct ‘becomes evil’, she writes, when it ‘foreseeably deprives others of basics 
needed for their lives . . . to be tolerable and decent’ (2002, p. 102, emphasis added).3 
Refining this definition further, systemic evils can be conceptualized as intolerable harms that 
indirectly yet foreseeably and avoidably degrade and destroy the humanity of vast numbers of 
people. I believe the structural violence of global poverty satisfies this definition. The 
structural nature of global poverty occurs in at least three pertinent ways. First, the global 
economic system functions specifically through the generation of exorbitant material 
inequality in both the developed and developing worlds. This inequality persists through 
time: historically speaking it was created in the (fairly recent) past, it is recreated in the 
present, and it is meant to be reproduced into the future. Under the principles of this system, 
the type of inequality that consigns many to severe poverty results from distributional 
policies and decisions taken within and between countries. Second, the historical pattern of 
global economic inequality largely has been replicated within the structural composition of 
the international political system. This system constitutes a political hierarchy formed around 
the relative advantages and disadvantages in the material status of different countries, and 
reflects longstanding processes of social discrimination, (re)colonization, and exclusion 
which concentrate wealth and power in the hands of the favoured few (Hurrell, 2001). Past 
inequities support contemporary inequities that in turn foster often vast political-economic 
inequalities. Third, global poverty also is born out of the intersubjective norms, ideologies, 
prejudices and negative stereotypes – including the alleged torpor, incompetence, 
fecklessness or innate victimhood of the poor – that are socially learned and latent in 
everyday life, contributing to a poverty-making ideational process that goes virtually 
unnoticed. These norms and beliefs often are combined with cognate essentialist stereotypes, 
such as those ascribed to race, gender, ethnicity and nationality. All of these social codings 
help create and sustain the perception that the poor and non-poor are fundamentally different 
in human terms, and that such difference seems natural and necessary. Taken together, these 
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structural dimensions of violence demonstrate that discrete, individual actions with 
observable and measurable consequences for particular individuals, can no longer in the era 
of globalization solely or sufficiently explain how our behaviour impinges harmfully on the 
lives of other people. 
 Although most people do not ‘want’ or ‘intend’ to cause the suffering and death of the 
world’s poorest, these are precisely the general effects of their ordinary practices when seen 
systemically rather than discretely. The systemic evil of global poverty gives rise to a kind of 
severe harm that differs from the lesser wrongs of injustice in that it destroys the basis for a 
properly human life, literally dehumanizing the vast numbers that it affects on a massive 
scale. This dehumanization has a specifically political character because ‘humanity’ refers to 
a category of relational status – that of being socially and politically recognized by others as 
someone who ‘counts’ as an equal and dignified human person. The perspective of structural 
violence helps to shift our view towards collective behaviours and institutional patterns that 
unjustifiably inflict ruinous conditions which negate the human status of millions of people. 
The world’s poorest are regarded as if they do not, or ought not to exist as equals. This 
situation, I argue, reveals the evil of existential violence at work. Existential violence is 
properly regarded as evil because it reduces the human to what is less than human. 
 Again, it is difficult to attribute the systemic evil of global poverty to the strict 
intentions of the many agents involved directly and indirectly in the global economy. It is 
deeply embedded in the structure and operation of the global economy as a whole, and of the 
international bodies primarily responsible for establishing and conducting the ‘governance’ of 
the global economy, such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International 
Monetary Fund (Hulme, 2010). This difficulty arises in large part from the fact that the 
contemporary political imagination is greatly influenced by the juridical paradigm of culpable 
wrongdoing. On that paradigm, wrongdoing is seen only when discrete actions can be 
causally isolated to a specific agent who is, moreover, institutionally allocated specific duties 
not to cause certain types of harm. Therefore, although the global institutional order breeds 
dehumanizing poverty as one of its normal functions and outcomes, we generally fail to view 
it as inexcusable wrongdoing because we cannot single out a specific perpetrator who is 
explicitly liable for causing (and remedying) harm. As we can witness from the global 
‘economic’ crisis since 2008, it is notable that the world presently is depicted as immersed in 
a ‘financial’ rather than a poverty crisis, even though the World Bank (2009) estimates that 
the crisis likely will ‘push’ 200 million more people into extreme poverty and contribute to 2 
million additional child deaths by 2015. 
 Because global poverty is supported by structural background conditions, it may elicit 
some moral condemnation but not the political outrage regularly evoked by the ‘official’ 
harms of torture, armed attacks on civilians, and genocide. However, as the work of Arendt 
demonstrates, when expanding our vision from the juridical to the political, it is possible to 
perceive the factual, experiential phenomenon of evil ‘committed on a giant scale’ that 
nonetheless cannot be traced either to a discrete intent or ‘to any particularity of wickedness, 
pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer’ (Arendt, 2003a, p. 159). Evil does not 
always speak the language of law. The ‘banality’ of the evil of global poverty stems from the 
fact that its ruinous destruction of humanity results from the conventional, everyday and 
shallow (what Arendt termed ‘thoughtless’) behaviour of millions of agents – behaviour 
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considered tolerable if not wholly ‘innocent’. Yet the failure to see global poverty as evil 
because it is not (yet) a ‘crime’ is largely attributable to the failure of political imagination. In 
order to challenge the invisibility of the evil of global poverty, we must widen the scope of 
the political imagination to satisfactorily include ‘third image’ systemic harms. 
 
Systemic Evil and Political Responsibility 
Card (2010, p. 237) proposes the vivid image of ‘social death’ to convey the sense of 
foreseeable, wrongful and intolerable evils that lead persons to suffer a profound loss of 
meaningful social relations and status. Social death may or may not be accompanied by 
physical death but, as noted above, such violence is existential insofar as it destroys a 
person’s ability to have and enjoy equal human status alongside others. The harm of social 
death short of killing someone is not captured well by the standard first and second images of 
evil, which remain fixed on the direct harms of ‘extraordinary’ human rights violations and 
crimes against humanity. Following from Card, I suggest that the systemic evil of global 
poverty is a form of social and even more specifically political death. Beyond narrow debates 
about whether the global economic system is ‘the’ causal agent of the suffering endured by 
the world’s poorest, and whether poverty ‘technically’ means to live below US $1.25 (PPP) 
per day or some other figure, the global poor suffer a social-political death in the sense that 
the avoidable degradation of their humanity fails to appear as such within the political 
imagination of evil. The failure to see the grave harm of global poverty as evil is linked to the 
way that many relinquish their responsibility to make judgements about dehumanizing 
systemic political conditions. 
 Why do we still find it so difficult to see poverty as a systemic evil? One clue might 
be gleaned from Slavoj Žižek’s analysis of the cultural and symbolic dimensions of systemic 
violence; systemic violence, he notes, refers to the ‘often catastrophic consequences of the 
smooth functioning of our economic and political systems’ (2008, p. 1). Žižek argues that 
language, symbolism and imagery can both display suffering that calls for our attention and 
also deaden our ability to be receptive to and think about the history and institutional source 
of that suffering. Representing poverty through the abstract technical figure of ‘$1.25 per 
day’, for example, derealizes the traumatic reality of bloated bellies, shrunken limbs, and 
children foraging for scraps in rubbish heaps. It functions inherently to project a ‘neutral’ 
data that obviates the imagining of demeaning conditions of extreme poverty. Therefore the 
inability or unwillingness of many to judge that the dehumanizing existential violence of 
extreme poverty is a type of evil may be reinforced not only by the way the juridical 
imagination obscures recognition of systemic evils; the framing of poverty and the poor 
within an ambivalent humanitarian imagination may contribute as well. Graphic images of 
malnourished and diseased children, which are projected through media as the master 
signifier of the concept ‘poverty’ by well-meaning NGOs, paradoxically can deflect our 
attention away from the political-economic arrangements that reproduce the antecedent 
conditions for poverty in the concrete. Such ‘humanitarian’ images can appear in the place of 
the reality of a dehumanized, impoverished existence, and block our ability to think critically 
about the history and institutional source of that violence (see Boltanski, 2004; Chouliaraki, 
2010). The humanitarian imagination exhibits a profound ambivalence towards poverty and 
the poor: while we often are drawn to the poor as objects of pity, charity or ‘humanitarian 
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aid’, we also reject and even despise them for intimating that something may not be quite 
right with business (and politics) as usual. The humanitarian imagination thus vacillates 
between contradictory representations of the affluent as ‘benevolent saviours’ of the ‘helpless 
poor’, and as ‘burdened rescuers’ of the ‘incompetent poor’; in either case the poor are 
located as peripheral objects of a depoliticized humanitarian narrative. Crucially, this 
amounts to a symbolic, cultural and political disavowal of shared responsibility with and for 
the poor. 
 One of Arendt’s major contributions to theorizing about responsibility was her focus 
on the political role of imagination in judgement, both in regard to the political subject and 
within the political realm. But what are the implications of a focus on imagination and 
judgement with regard to poverty? Arendt herself observed that poverty cannot ‘become 
visible’ as a ‘human phenomenon’ unless it provokes a sense of ‘moral indignation’ that 
situates the occurrence of poverty within its political context (2003b, p. 89). Indeed, ‘to 
arouse indignation’, she tells us, ‘is one of the qualities of excessive poverty insofar as 
poverty occurs among human beings’ (1994, p. 403). Yet indignation is distinct from the 
‘sentimentality or moralizing’ pity of humanitarianism (Arendt, 1963, pp. 75–85). By 
regarding poverty only as an ‘objective fact’ that exists independently of its modes of 
(re)production in the common political realm, Arendt insists, we further ‘dehumanize’ the 
poor by reinforcing the notion that they do not belong as political equals and fail to reach a 
genuinely political judgement as to why poverty is such an evil (Arendt, 2003b, p. 89). 
Making poverty visible would mean that we see how the poor are overdetermined by their 
association with the imagery of biological life or death, behind which no politically relevant 
person can be discerned. While poverty is a type of material insufficiency, it is 




 To make poverty truly visible for those who do not experience it directly requires 
relating to it in such a way that it appears within a common world, that is, a shared space 
within which the affluent and the poor appear together in their worldly plurality. This 
connecting together of diverse people and their experiences points to the representational 
function of the imagination, which sets the stage for the political work of judgement and 
understanding. For Arendt, imagination keeps experiences that are too close to us from 
falling easily into bias or prejudice, and those that are remote from us from becoming alien 
and unfathomable. Only the imagination, as Arendt puts it, ‘enables us to see things in their 
proper perspective’; it breaks through the sterility of abstract categorizations and bridges the 
experiences of those differently situated (Arendt, 1994, p. 323). Thoughtlessness here then 
refers to a kind of unimaginative remoteness from the miseries of poverty compounded by the 
complacent repetition of trivial and empty ‘truths’ about the poor themselves. In this respect, 
thoughtlessness is an impoverishment of the imagination which contributes to neutralizing 
judgement and responsibility. 
 Arendt views judgement through at least three related lenses (Benhabib, 1988). The 
first is that of the moral faculty of distinguishing good from evil. The second is that of a 
retrospective faculty which we use to view the past, to evaluate what was, and to derive 
meaning that informs our present understanding. The third is that of our ability to think 
representatively, which appeals to an ‘enlarged mentality’ or sensus communis. The political 
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character of judgement Arendt invokes acknowledges that imagination makes possible an 
‘enlarged mentality’ which allows us to question and reshape a common sensibility and frame 
of reference about what is evil among and between different individuals, communities and 
countries. Whereas determinant judgements occur when a particular is subsumed under a 
universal concept or a priori rule, reflective judgements arise from the imaginative process of 
ascending from a given particular to a general claim by appealing to specific examples in 
order to draw or reveal previously unseen connections (Arendt, 1992, pp. 83–85). Appealing 
to particular examples supports our ability to imagine what it is like to be in someone else’s 
place, makes present the standpoint of others, breaks through established opinions and 
prejudices, and ensures our judgements are not merely expressions of our own beliefs and 
experiences. Reflective judgement thereby acquires an exemplary validity by appealing to, 
imagining, and relating the plural experiences and viewpoints of others (Arendt, 1992, pp. 
70–77). 
 What difference can reflective judgement make when judging whether the structural 
violence of global poverty is evil? There are two crucial ways it matters. First, it brings us at 
least one small step nearer to the sorts of factual truth necessary to manifest political 
judgement. Political judgement is representative inasmuch as it comes from considering the 
different viewpoints of others as well as our own; one forms a judgement by ‘making present 
to [one’s] mind the standpoints’ of others, especially those whose lives may be otherwise 
remote from our own (Arendt, 1968, p. 241). The more people’s standpoints a person has 
present in her mind the better that person can imagine how she would think and feel about a 
given issue, such as chronic poverty, if she were in their place. These standpoints embody 
both factual truths of others’ lives and opinions as to the moral meaning and political 
implications of such truths. By way of illustration, consider the following example described 
by Arendt (2003a, p. 140): 
 
[S]uppose I look at a specific slum dwelling and I perceive in this particular building 
the general notion which it does not exhibit directly, the notion of poverty and misery. I 
arrive at this notion by representing to myself how I would feel if I had to live there, 
that is, I try to think in the place of the slum-dweller. The judgement I shall come up 
with will by no means necessarily be the same as that of the inhabitants whom time and 
hopelessness may have dulled to the outrage of their condition, but it will become an 
outstanding example for my further judging of these matters. 
 
 Understanding poverty thus requires ways of imagining where we can proceed to the 
generalized through reflective attention to the concrete and particular. One puts oneself into 
the position of the slum-dweller not only in order to better understand one’s own position – 
through a kind of situated impartiality or ‘disinterestedness’ from one’s own private interests 
– but to better understand from the other’s point of view the reality of a life lived in poverty. 
Reflective judgement raises precisely such questions of what we see when we encounter 
images of poverty. Are we able to see the world not just through staggering statistics, but 
through the eyes of a child in Brazil or the Philippines, whose father has been murdered or 
mother has been the victim of sexual violence, and who spends her days picking through 
rubbish and collecting contaminated water, while caring for siblings suffering from malaria 
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and tuberculosis? Can we envision this child’s concrete history, needs, wishes and rights and 
link them to our own? Can we see and think ‘this is what the making of a less than human 
existence entails; this is what evil looks like’? This kind of representative thinking activity 
becomes political by separating us from our own personal concerns and enabling us to 
encounter the lived realities of the differently situated. Clearly reflective judgement is not 
itself sufficient to remedy the problem of poverty, but it is necessary if the concealed political 
conditions of dehumanizing poverty are to be brought into meaningful public light. The 
reflective enrichment of our sense of reality through guiding examples of lived deprivation is 
an indispensable pathway towards sharpening the judgement that global poverty is indeed an 
inexcusable evil. 
 The second way that the political imagination of reflective judgement matters is that, 
if one were to judge global poverty as an intolerable evil, then one would be in a better 
position to recognize the nature of political responsibility for avoiding or eliminating such 
structural harm. Arendt again is helpful here. Judgement from an enlarged mentality differs 
from judgement from an abstract Archimedean point. Rather than seeing a situation from an 
objective and external position, one both imagines how one would think and feel if placed in 
that situation, and how others might view the same situation from different perspectives. 
Judging from an Archimedean point corresponds well to the juridical imagination and its 
characterization of liability arising from discrete harms that result directly from the actions or 
omissions of specific agents. The juridical imagination assumes a position of obtaining 
transparent knowledge of strict causality and a specific purpose- or aim-based intent, in order 
to assign guilt or innocence according to a legal model of responsibility. On this model, 
responsibility arises only when a causal relationship is clearly visible between specific acts 
committed for purposes of bringing about prohibited results and the discrete harms 
themselves; responsibility and harms remain invisible in the absence of such strict causal 
transparency. The legal model of responsibility has become part of our conventional image 
and everyday understanding of evil – evil is due to specific isolatable actions and 
responsibility for evil is assigned only to those who can be causally connected to standard 
types of harm arising from them. This model allows us to ‘quarantine’ evil from its wider 
structural mooring. 
 Yet the legal model is inadequate to understanding the shared nature of our 
responsibility for systemic evils, however indirectly or unintentionally we may have 
contributed to them. Arendt’s position in contrast emphasizes a situated political notion of 
responsibility. By political responsibility, she means assuming the burden of acting in order 
to care for a shared world where we organize ourselves collectively and each person’s fate is 
situated in relation to a plurality of others; in political co-existence we are responsible both 
for our own actions as well as for the actions of others which we did not commit, by virtue of 
our participation in the collective activities themselves (Arendt, 2003a, p. 149). Political 
responsibility is strictly political insofar as it emphasizes the social connectedness of 
individuals and their complicity in shared socio-political conditions and arrangements that 
may give rise to harms (as well as to benefits) caused by those conditions and arrangements. 
Political responsibility is ‘vicarious’ in that we are mutually liable for things done in the 
name of our collective projects, the foreseeable outcomes of which are the result of everyday 
institutional structures and actions. This ‘taking upon ourselves’ the consequences for harms 
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we have not directly caused individually is, Arendt stresses, the political ‘price we pay for the 
fact that we live our lives not by ourselves but among our fellow men’ (2003a, pp. 157–58). 
 From the viewpoint of shared political responsibility, we imagine ourselves as 
responsible not only for our own actions and their effects on those directly connected to us, 
but also for intolerably harmful structures or institutions that we did not obviously cause or 
intend to sustain. We see such harmful structures as evil because of the existential violence 
they do to those who suffer from their foreseeable yet avoidable effects. Unlike the juridical 
imagination and its legal model of responsibility, the political imagination and its model of 
shared responsibility are more adequate for making large-scale structural violence visible. 
While it may not be possible to map transparently the totality of chains of causation that 
generate global poverty, it is possible to imagine how the cumulative norms, beliefs and 
practices of millions of people create and sustain it. And while it may not be possible to 
assign responsibility for global poverty to a single individual or agent, it is possible to 
imagine that we have a collective responsibility to transform the systemic conditions which 
perpetuate global poverty. But this political responsibility needs a properly political 
imagination to invest our past, present and future images of evil with an enlarged mentality 
oriented toward what Arendt describes as a ‘world of universal interdependence’ (1968, p. 
242). Such an enlarged mentality would require that we ask questions about, rather than look 
away from, the historical and social antecedents that facilitate entrenched poverty, 
interrogating our own implication in what has taken place. Alongside this quest for 
understanding, it also requires a willingness to deploy our power to imagine and exercise 




This article has argued that international politics has fixated on an unduly narrow discourse 
and image of evil. The individualistic and statist images of evil concentrate almost 
exclusively on identifying liability rather than on the appearance of intolerable harms that 
arise from complex collective actions. A broader and more critical vision would see severe 
poverty as an evil outcome of global political-economic processes that both enable 
domination by those who hold economic power and reproduce political inequality between 
persons. Indeed, severe inequality and exclusion have grown alongside the privileges of 
global interdependence; recent estimates suggest that the richest 1% of the global population 
own 40% of the global wealth (the top 10% own nearly 85% of global wealth) while the 
poorest 40% get only 3%, a scandalous disparity that has increased since 1990 (UNICEF, 
2011). In this way our interconnected and interdependent political spaces are systemically 
segregated by dehumanizing conditions whose combined effects expose the worst-off to 
disastrous existential violence, even though many of us have no direct causal link to that 
outcome. 
 As this broader vision also suggests, the collective imagination is an indispensable 
stimulus of our moral and political universe. Without rekindling that universe through 
reworking our political imagination to make visible the structural conditions under which 
people are living it becomes sterile and unreal, supporting an existentially violent world in 
which systemic evil is self-making. The juridical and humanitarian imaginations have their 
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roles to play in international politics, but they do not necessarily help us to better see the 
background conditions and systemic norms that underpin the abject status of the world’s 
poor. The international politics of evil remains, unimaginatively, too tightly identified with 
stock images of causally discrete exceptional crimes and ad hoc humanitarian crises. There 
are drawbacks to this decontextualized myopia; as Arendt (1968, p. 242) observes, a ‘lack of 
imagination and failure to judge’ go hand in hand. While the juridical imagination can 
diminish our vision of harmful political processes and arrangements, the humanitarian 
imagination can blind us to political responsibility and judgement. Conversely, the political 
imagination can kindle an awareness of deep and pervasive systemic evil as part of our 
shared world and for which responsibility needs to be assumed. It can advance 
acknowledgement that political responsibility arises from partaking in the collective actions 
of a global system that bring about inexcusable wrongs. In this sense, refashioning the image 
of evil through the alternative narrative of structural violence may well challenge the 
paradigmatic – and curiously reassuring – first and second images of ‘self-contained’ 
individualistic and statist evil, although of course it too remains open to challenge. Yet this 
alternative narrative about evil can provide some measure of direction towards assuming 
responsibility for altering our collective imagination of what is indefensible suffering in a 





 The topic of the imagination, whether in politics or elsewhere, is fraught with conceptual 
and methodological complexities that are beyond the scope of this paper to address. One 
problem is that the imagination or the ‘imaginary’ is often contrasted with what is ‘real’. But 
it is a mistake to suppose that the imagination means merely ‘illusory’, since of course the 
imagination can have very real effects and virtually all political actions must be interpreted in 
terms of how the ‘the political’ itself is imaginatively framed. Thus although the argument 
here takes evil to be a really existing phenomenon, this phenomenon is always portrayed and 
understood in varying ways through discursive interpretations and symbolic representations; 
what is considered evil and why is a deeply meaningful yet also contested aspect of the 
human condition. In contrast to many contemporary works on evil in IR, then, I focus on the 
interplay of the idea and the reality of evil in the political imagination and not merely on the 
discourse of evil as a rhetorical device. 
2
 This tendency is reflected most prominently in the recent discourse (and purported practice) 
of ‘the responsibility to protect’; see for example Hehir (2010). 
3
 In The Atrocity Paradigm Card focuses on harms produced by ‘culpable wrongdoing’, while 
she revises her view in Confronting Evils (2010) to focus on harms produced by ‘inexcusable 
wrongs’. The latter view is, I believe, better able to accommodate the notion of systemic evil. 
4
 To avoid confusion, then, what is being suggested is that liberation from coercively imposed 
systemic material deprivation is a necessary though not sufficient condition for acquiring and 
exercising effective political status and agency; it is a precondition for the creation of the 
properly human political condition. Stated otherwise, my concern is not with economic 
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